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Abstract
In a recent paper Griffiths [38] has argued, based on the consistent
histories interpretation, that Hilbert space quantum mechanics (QM)
is noncontextual. According to Griffiths the problem of contextuality
disappears if the apparatus is “designed and operated by a competent
experimentalist” and we accept the Single Framework Rule (SFR). We
will argue from a representational realist stance that the conclusion is
incorrect due to the misleading understanding provided by Griffiths to
the meaning of quantum contextuality and its relation to physical re-
ality and measurements. We will discuss how the quite general incom-
prehension of contextuality has its origin in the “objective-subjective
omelette” created by Heisenberg and Bohr. We will argue that in
order to unscramble the omelette we need to disentangle, firstly, rep-
resentational realism from naive realism, secondly, ontology from epis-
temology, and thirdly, the different interpretational problems of QM.
In this respect, we will analyze what should be considered as Mean-
ingful Physical Statements (MPS) within a theory and will argue that
Counterfactual Reasoning (CR) —considered by Griffiths as “tricky”—
must be accepted as a necessary condition for any representational real-
ist interpretation of QM. Finally we discuss what should be considered
as a problem (and what not) in QM from a representational realist
perspective.
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Contextuality is one of the main features of Quantum Mechanics (QM), a
feature which has been present since the early discussions of the founding
fathers. Indeed the relation of the quantum formalism to definite experimen-
tal arrangements is one that has no analogue in classical theories. However,
there is still today no consensus in the community of physicists and philoso-
phers who discuss the foundational problems of QM, about the exact defi-
nition or the physical meaning of quantum contextuality. This controversy
goes back to the discussions and debates between, for example, Einstein and
Bohr. While Einstein used the contextual character of the theory in order
to show the inconsistencies of the quantum formalism when related to ele-
ments of physical reality —as defined in his 1935 EPR paper, co-authored
jointly with Podolsky and Rosen [33]—, Bohr used exactly this same feature
in order to answer the EPR argument [12]. In a recent paper Griffiths has
argued that Hilbert space QM is actually noncontextual. According to Grif-
fiths the problem of contextuality disappears if the apparatus is “designed
and operated by a competent experimentalist” and we accept the Single
Framework Rule (SFR). In the present paper we attempt to argue, not only
that contextuality is one of the main features of the quantum formalism,
but also that there are several flaws in the arguments presented by Griffiths
which are mainly due to the multiple shifts in the metaphysical standpoint
of analysis. In order to make clear our own stance we will begin by clearly
stating our representational realist stance from which we attempt to discuss
and analyze Griffiths’ arguments against quantum contextuality. The paper
is organized as follows. In section 1, we discuss what are the main features
of a representational realist stance with respect to physics distinguishing
it from “naive” realism and other philosophical positions which deny the
theory-ladenness of physical experience. Section 2 provides an analysis of
the meaning of contextuality and the physical constraints it involves in rela-
tion to any interpretation of QM that attempts to stay close to the orthodox
Hilbert space formalism. In section 3, we discuss the “quantum omelette”
created by Bohr and Heisenberg by cooking together objective and subjec-
tive perspectives of analysis. Section 4 attempts to describe the orthodox
problems of QM, their specific questioning, their metaphysical presupposi-
tions and limits of applicability. We shall focus on the distinction between
the basis problem and the measurement problem. Section 5 argues in favor
of the definition of Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS) within a theory
and the need to consider Counterfactual Reasoning (CR) as a necessary con-
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dition in order to provide a physical representation of reality. In section 6
we analyze and discuss Griffiths’ arguments against quantum contextuality
in terms of four main points put forward in [38]. Finally, in section 7, we
discuss what should be considered as a problem (and what not) in QM from
a representational realist perspective.
1 The Representational Realist Stance
Physics has been always connected to different philosophical stances, but
certainly, realism is one of the main viewpoints within the history of physics.
The main presupposition of realism with respect to physics is that physical
theories talk about reality. According to our representational realist stance
[21, 22], which will be presupposed through the rest of the paper, the funda-
ment of any physical theory is physical representation and not experimental
data —the latter should be regarded by a representational realist only as
part of the confirmation (or failure) of the empirical adequacy of a theory.
Indeed, the representational realist takes as a standpoint the existence of
Nature adding to it the idea that such existence can be represented through
the interrelation of mathematical formalisms and conceptual networks allow-
ing us to predict and understand specific phenomena. This realist stance,
which relates to Heisenberg’s closed theory approach [13], goes against any
type of “naive” realism that denies the theory ladenness of physical experi-
ence. Against the idea that one could distinguish between phenomena and
raw observable data we have argued in [22] that even a ‘click’ in a detec-
tor or a ‘spot’ in a cloud chamber are only determined through the logical
and ontological principles of existence, non-contradiction and identity. Such
principles are not something that we find out in the world but rather meta-
physical presuppositions that shape even our most basic experience. We
have argued that even ‘clicks’ and ‘spots’ found in a laboratory are theory
laden. Any stance going against representational realism must be capable
of producing arguments that explain how physical experience can account
for phenomena without the need of presupposing a physical representation.
Physical representation allow us to think about experience and predict
phenomena without the need of actually performing any experiment. This
is of course a completely different standpoint from those of many empiri-
cist approaches who argue instead that the fundament of physics is ‘actual
experimental data’. For example, as remarked by van Fraassen [50, pp. 202-
203]: “To develop an empiricist account of science is to depict it as involving
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a search for truth only about the empirical world, about what is actual and
observable.” Even though there are different positions with respect to the
consideration of what accounts to be an empirically adequate theory (see
e.g. [11, p. 351]) we would like to draw a line distinguishing between those
stances that accept the theory ladenness of physical experience and those
which deny it. Our analysis is only concerned with the former.1
Following van Fraassen [51, p. xviii], we have called the attention to
the importance of making explicit the metaphysical stance that one takes
in order to analyze a specific problem [21, 22]. As we shall argue in this pa-
per, the mixing and entanglement of realist and empiricist standpoints and
of ontological and epistemological perspectives within QM has produced a
weird mix of problems which are too frequently turned into pseudoproblems.
In this respect we would like to make clear right from the start what should
be considered to be the kernel of a representational realist account of physics:
Representational Realism about Physical Theories (RRPT): A rep-
resentational realist account of a physical theory must be capable of providing
a physical representation of reality in terms of a network of concepts which
relates to the mathematical formalism of the theory and allows to make pre-
dictions of definite phenomena.
Contrary to our definition of realism in physics which considers representa-
tion as a main construct of physical theories, naive realism claims instead
that physical observation provides direct access to reality as it is. This idea
was already implicit in the logical positivist distinction between theoretical
terms and empirical terms. But even though in the philosophy of science
community this distinction is characterized as “naive”, many of the prob-
lems discussed in the literature still presuppose implicitly such distinction.
Indeed, as remarked by Curd and Cover [18, p. 1228]: “Logical positivism
is dead and logical empiricism is no longer an avowed school of philosophical
thought. But despite our historical and philosophical distance from logical
positivism and empiricism, their influence can be felt. An important part of
their legacy is observational-theoretical distinction itself, which continues to
1We acknowledge however that the theory ladenness of physical experience is still today
controversial within philosophy of science. As remarked by Bogen and Woodward [11, p.
304]: “The positivist picture of the structure of scientific theories is now widely rejected.
But the underlying idea that scientific theories are primarily designed to predict and
explain claims about what we observe remains enormously influential, even among the
sharpest critics of positivism.”
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play a central role in debates about scientific realism.” We have argued that
the naive realist stance is not only philosophically untenable but maybe even
more importantly, closes the door to a fundamental development of physics
—since such stance assumes we already know what reality is in terms of
(naive) observation.
From a realist perspective, physics attempts to describe a world in which
we humans have no special preeminence with respect to existence. In this
respect, the description or representation provided by classical physics was
clearly specified since Newton’s mechanics in terms of systems constituted
by definite valued properties; i.e., in general terms, what is called an Actual
State of Affairs (ASA).2 Also from a realist viewpoint, measurement and
observation have been always considered as a way of exposing or discovering
such preexistent ASA. But, as we know —contrary to classical physics— QM
places serious difficulties for such a realist representation. An evidence of the
deep crisis of physical representation within the theory of the quanta is the
fact that more than one century after its creation the physics community has
reached no consensus about what the theory is talking about. Indeed, for
many a consistent interpretation that would match this strange formalism to
a physical representation of reality seems to difficult to be found, for others
it is enough for QM to account for the correct measurement outcomes.
Of course, when discussing about QM and its interpretation there are
multiple standpoints and interpretative strategies that one can assume. For
example, one can argue —as it has been done already by Fuchs and Peres
[34, p. 70]— that “[...] quantum theory does not describe physical real-
ity. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for
the macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of ex-
perimental interventions. This strict definition of the scope of quantum
theory is the only interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or
theorists.” This instrumentalist perspective is satisfied with having an algo-
rithmic recipe that allows us to calculate measurement outcomes from the
formalism. But this is certainly not enough for a representational realist, for
whom the formalism should be capable of relating coherently an interpreta-
tion which allows to provide a physical representation of reality according
to the theory [22]. In contrast, within a representational realist approach
to QM there are two main possibilities. The first one is to argue that QM
makes reference to the same physical representation provided by classical
physics; i.e. that it talks about an ASA. This is, for example, the main idea
2See for discussion and definition of this notion in the context of classical physics [26].
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presupposed by the Hidden Variable Program (HVP) which, as noticed by
Bacciagaluppi [7, p. 74], attempts to “restore a classical way of thinking
about what there is.” The second possibility is to consider that QM might
describe physical reality in a different, maybe even incommensurable, way to
that of classical physics. This possibility seems to be endorsed by Griffiths
[38, p. 174] who argues that many of the problems with the interpretation of
QM come from “the view that the real world is classical, contrary to all we
have learned from the development of quantum mechanics in the twentieth
century.” In relation to this debate, one of the main aspects that divides the
foundational community discussing the interpretation of QM is the issue of
contextuality. Unfortunately, the meaning of quantum contextuality and its
implication with respect to the interpretation of the theory remains within
the literature not only unclear but also misleading due —we will argue— to
an entangled analysis which mixes ontological and epistemological concerns,
problems and solutions.
2 The Contextual Character of QM
We have argued extensively in [21] that quantum contextuality is directly
related to the impossibility to provide a description in terms of an ASA.
This is something completely new in physics. In classical physics, every
physical system may be described exclusively by means of its actual prop-
erties, taking “actuality” as expressing the preexistent mode of being of the
properties themselves, independently of observation —the “pre” referring to
its existence previous to measurement.3 The evolution of the system may
be described by the change of its actual properties. Mathematically, the
state is represented by a point (p; q) in the correspondent phase space Γ
and, given the initial conditions, the equation of motion tells us how this
point moves in Γ. Physical magnitudes are represented by real functions
over Γ. These functions can be all interpreted as possessing definite values
at any time, independently of physical observation. Thus, as mentioned
above, each magnitude can be interpreted as being actually preexistent to
any possible measurement without conflicting with the mathematical for-
mulation of the theory. In this scheme, speaking about potential or possible
properties usually refers to functions of the points in Γ to which the state of
the system might arrive to in a future instant of time; these points, in turn
3Notice that even relativity theory allows for a description in terms of an ASA since
space-time events are always considers as preexistent.
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are also completely determined by the equations of motion and the initial
conditions. It should be also remarked that just like the notions of possibility
and potentiality, classical probability —considered as a physical notion4—
also makes always reference (in terms of ignorance) to a preexistent ASA.
In QM, contrary to the classical scheme, physical magnitudes are rep-
resented by operators on H that, in general, do not commute. This math-
ematical fact has extremely problematic interpretational consequences for
it is then difficult to affirm that these quantum magnitudes are simultane-
ously preexistent (i.e., objective). In order to restrict the discourse to sets of
commuting magnitudes, different Complete Sets of Commuting Operators
(CSCO) have to be (subjectively) chosen. And here is where the mixing
of the objective and the subjective takes place. Indeed, the way to solve
this uncomfortable situation within the orthodox approach is to introduce
a subjective choice —in between the many contexts— that reintroduces su-
perficially the classical structure (see for discussion [26]). It is this ad hoc
move, which mixes the subjective with the objective, what needs to be phys-
ically justified. But even what many consider the best candidate to account
for this interpretational maneuver, namely the principle of decoherence, has
failed to provide a convincing physical explanation of the quantum to clas-
sical limit [1, 35]. As remarked by Bacciagaluppi [8], some physicists and
philosophers still believe “decoherence would provide a solution to the mea-
surement problem of quantum mechanics. As pointed out by many authors,
however (e.g. Adler 2003; Zeh 1995, pp. 1415), this claim is not tenable. [...]
Unfortunately, naive claims of the kind that decoherence gives a complete
answer to the measurement problem are still somewhat part of the ‘folklore’
of decoherence, and deservedly attract the wrath of physicists (e.g. Pearle
1997) and philosophers (e.g. Bub 1997, Chap. 8) alike” (see also [9]). As a
matter of fact, still today there is no convincing physical explanation of the
so called “quantum to classical limit”.
The idea that one needs to choose (subjectively) a context in order to de-
termine which are the (objective) observables that have definite values is not
only a contradictio in adjecto since it is the subjective choice which deter-
4As remarked in [21, chapter 7] probability should be distinguished as a physical notion
from a mathematical one. The latter does not need to be considered necessarily in terms
of a physical interpretation. However, this mathematical understanding of probability
departs from a realist understanding of it. As Schro¨dinger [17, p. 115] makes the point:
“[a probabilistic statement] has meaning only if one is indeed convinced that the something
in question quite definitely is or is not the case. A probabilistic assertion presupposes the
full reality of its subject.”
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mines objective physical existence explicitly —the ASA is only determined
after the choice of the experimenter— but also violates explicitly counter-
factual reasoning which is maybe the most important feature of physical
representation itself —a feature which allows us to go beyond the discourse
about mere ‘measurement outcomes’ (we will come back to this point in
section 5). Let us be now more specific about the formal meaning of contex-
tuality through the analysis of the formalism of the theory (see also [28]).
In QM the frames under which a vector is represented mathematically are
considered in terms of orthonormal bases. We say that a set {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆
H an n-dimensional Hilbert space is an orthonormal basis if 〈xi|xj〉 = 0 for
all 1 ≤ i〈j ≤ n and 〈xi|xi〉 = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. A physical quantity is
represented by a self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert spaceH. We say that A
is a context ifA is a commutative subalgebra generated by a set of self-adjoint
bounded operators {A1, . . . , As} of H. Quantum contextuality, which was
most explicitly recognized through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem [46],
asserts that a value ascribed to a physical quantity A cannot be part of
a global assignment of values but must, instead, depend on some specific
context from which A is to be considered. Let us see this with some more
detail.
Physically, a global valuation allows us to define the preexistence of
definite properties. Mathematically, a valuation over an algebra A of self-
adjoint operators on a Hilbert space, is a real function satisfying,
1. Value-Rule (VR): For any A ∈ A, the value v(A) belongs to the spec-
trum of A, v(A) ∈ σ(A).
2. Functional Composition Principle (FUNC): For any A ∈ A and any
real-valued function f , v(f(A)) = f(v(A)).
We say that the valuation is a Global Valuation (GV) if A is the set of
all bounded, self-adjoint operators. In case A is a context, we say that
the valuation is a Local Valuation (LV). We call the mathematical property
which allows us to paste consistently together multiple contexts of LVs into
a single GV, Value Invariance (VI). First assume that a GV v exists and
consider a family of contexts {Ai}I . Define the LV vi := v|Ai over each
Ai. Then it is easy to verify that the set {vi}I satisfies the Compatibility
Condition (CC),
vi|Ai∩Aj = vj |Ai∩Aj , ∀i, j ∈ I.
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The CC is a necessary condition that must satisfy a family of LVs in order
to determine a GV. We say that the algebra of self-adjoint operators is VI
if for every family of contexts {Ai}I and LVs vi : Ai → R satisfying the CC,
there exists a GV v such that v|Ai = vi.
If we have VI, and hence, a GV exists, this would allow us to give values
to all magnitudes at the same time maintaining a CC in the sense that
whenever two magnitudes share one or more projectors, the values assigned
to those projectors are the same in every context. The KS theorem, in
algebraic terms, rules out the existence of GVs when the dimension of the
Hilbert space is greater than 2. The following theorem is an adaptation of
the KS theorem —as stated in [31, Theorem 3.2]— to the case of contexts:
Theorem 2.1 (KS Theorem) If H is a Hilbert space of dim(H)〉2, then
a global valuation is not possible. 2
After having recalled the KS theorem we are now ready to add some
physical discussion. Some remarks go in order:
I. KS type theorems preclude a physical representation of the formalism
in terms of an ASA.
If physical reality is conceived in terms of an ASA, then it is not pos-
sible to claim that Ψ describes an actual situation irrespectively of the
choice of a context. Not all observables can be considered to be si-
multaneously actual (real). Notice that such consequence only applies
when the metaphysical equality, ‘Actuality = Reality’, is assumed.
II. KS type theorems have nothing to do with probabilities.
Going against a common phrase —continuously repeated within the
literature— that says that “QM is a probabilistic theory” it should be
clear that KS theorem does not talk about mean values of observables
—as it is the case for Bell inequalities— but instead discusses about
the definite values of quantum properties [21, chapter 5].
III. KS type theorems have nothing to do with measurements.
There is no need of actual measurements for the KS theorem to stand.
The theorem is not talking about measurement outcomes, but about
the preexistence of properties, or in other words, about the constraints
implied by the formalism to projection operators (interpreted in terms
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of properties that pertain to a quantum system). Therefore, quan-
tum contextuality cannot be tackled through an analysis in terms of
measurements simply because there is no reference at all to any mea-
surement outcome.
IV. KS type theorems have nothing to do with evolution or dynamics of
properties.
There is no evolution or dynamics considered for the KS theorem to
stand. The theorem makes reference to the possible values of projec-
tion operators (interpreted as properties of a system) at one single
instant of time. There is no question regarding the evolution of such
properties, it is only their simultaneous consistent values considered
from different contexts which is at stake.
V. KS type theorems in a nutshell.
Put in a nutshell, quantum contextuality deals with the formal condi-
tions that any realist interpretation which respects orthodox Hilbert
space QM must consider in order to consistently provide a physical
representation of reality.
Contextuality does not imply that QM is condemned to describing a sub-
jectivist world in which each experimenter decides what is real and what is
not, it only shows that there are severe constraints to any attempt to inter-
pret the orthodox formalism of QM in terms of “classical physical reality”.
But of course taking contextuality into account, there are different possi-
bilities to be discussed and analyzed (section 7). However, we understand
that to deny contextuality in QM is simply to deny the formalism of the
theory, for this feature is a consequence of the fundamental mathematical
structure of the theory, a formal scheme which has been allowing us for more
than one century to produce the most outstanding predictions of phenom-
ena. The feature of contextuality emerges from the formalism itself, it is
not something external to it. Trying to neglect contextuality by adding ad
hoc rules in order to recover a particular metaphysical scheme seems to us
highly problematic for physics should be considered as a field in continuous
development and not one that attempts to justify or match what we already
know.
Unfortunately, instead of regarding quantum contextuality as a new in-
teresting feature of a physical theory most attempts go against it in order
to recover a physical representation in terms of an ASA. The first attempt
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is the HVP which searches for a new formalism of QM in order to satisfy
certain metaphysical desires. A second, less explicit approach, is assumed
by several interpretations (e.g., CH interpretation) which introduce ad hoc
rules in order to recover a classical discourse.5 The CH interpretation, just
like the HVP, also denies the formalism, not by changing it explicitly —
as in the case of the former— but by “blocking” its consequences through
the introduction of the Single Framework Rule (SFR). We believe that to
deny contextuality just because it obstructs an interpretation of the theory
in terms of actuality would be tantamount to trying to deny the Lorentz
transformations in special relativity simply because of its implications to
the contraction of rigid rods. Indeed, this was the attempt of most con-
servative physicists until Einstein made the strong interpretational move of
taking seriously the formalism of the theory and derived the physical con-
sequences from it. If we accept the orthodox formalism, then contextuality
is the crux of QM, it is that which needs to be physically interpreted in-
stead of something that needs to be destroyed because of its non-classical
consequences.
3 The ‘Objective-Subjective Omelette’ in QM
One of the main reasons for the general incomprehension of the deep con-
sequences of contextuality within the literature is the mixing of ontological
and epistemological perspectives and problems. As most clearly stated by
Jaynes:
“[O]ur present [quantum mechanical] formalism is not purely episte-
mological; it is a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Nature,
in part incomplete human information about Nature —all scrambled
up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen how
to unscramble. Yet we think that the unscrambling is a prerequisite
for any further advance in basic physical theory. For, if we cannot sep-
arate the subjective and objective aspects of the formalism, we cannot
know what we are talking about; it is just that simple.” [45, p. 381]
Indeed, we have argued extensively that Bohr is responsible for pro-
ducing an epistemological interpretation of QM that does not only limit
5As we shall discuss in section 5 such interpretations block the set of meaningful phys-
ical statements that can be derived from the theory itself.
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physical representation in terms of classical language and phenomena but
also precludes the very possibility of introducing and developing new (non-
classical) concepts [23, 24]. This was done by Bohr by means of two main
desiderata. Unfortunately, since the mid 20th century the Orthodox Line
of Research (OLR), presupposed these two Bohrian desiderata as almost
necessary standpoints to think about the interpretation of QM. The first
metaphysical presupposition is the idea that there must exist a “quantum
to classical limit”, implying what Bokulich calls an “open theory approach”
[13]. This idea was put forward by Bohr in terms of his correspondence
principle [15].
1. Quantum to Classical Limit: The principle that one must find a
“bridge” or “limit” between classical mechanics and QM.
The second metaphysical principle which has guided the OLR can be also
traced back to Bohr’s claim that physical experience needs to be expressed
exclusively in terms of classical physical language [16].
2. Classical Representation of Physics: The principle that one needs
to presuppose the classical representation of physics in order to discuss
about phenomena and interpret QM.
Bohr [53, p. 7] claimed that: “[...] the unambiguous interpretation of any
measurement must be essentially framed in terms of classical physical theo-
ries, and we may say that in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell
will remain the language of physicists for all time.” In this respect, also
according to Bohr [Op. cit.], “it would be a misconception to believe that
the difficulties of the atomic theory may be evaded by eventually replacing
the concepts of classical physics by new conceptual forms.”
Heisenberg, probably forced by his controversial political situation after
the war, helped Bohr to support his epistemological approach even putting
a name to it: “The Copenhagen Interpretation of QM” (see for discussion
[44]). The book Physics and Philosophy [42] —were the term appeared for
the first time— shows, on the one hand, Heisenberg’s fantastic historical
and philosophical knowledge about physics, and on the other, his troubled
—close to complete inconsistency— interpretation of QM. The so called
Copenhagen interpretation invented by Hesienberg attempted to bring to-
gether not only Bohr’s epistemological approach but also his own Platonist
realism about mathematical equations in physical theories [?, p. 91]. While
Bohr’s anti-metaphysical commitment considered the language of classical
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physics as the very fundament of phenomena, Heisenberg’s closed theory
approach insisted in the radical incommensurability of the concepts used in
different physical theories [14]. A good example of the quantum omelette
cooked in Heisenberg’s book is the following passage:
“With regard to this situation Bohr has emphasized that it is more
realistic to state that the division into the object and the rest of the
world is not arbitrary. Our actual situation in research work in atomic
physics is usually this: we wish to understand a certain phenomenon,
we wish to recognize how this phenomenon follows from the general
laws of nature. Therefore, that part of matter or radiation which
takes part in the phenomenon is the natural ‘object’ in the theoretical
treatment and should be separated in this respect from the tools used
to study the phenomenon. This again emphasizes a subjective element
in the description of atomic events, since the measuring device has
been constructed by the observer, and we have to remember that what
we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of
questioning. Our scientific work in physics consists in asking questions
about nature in the language that we possess and trying to get an
answer from experiment by the means that are at our disposal. In this
way quantum theory reminds us, as Bohr has put it, of the old wisdom
that when searching for harmony in life one must never forget that in
the drama of existence we are ourselves both players and spectators.
It is understandable that in our scientific relation to nature our own
activity becomes very important when we have to deal with parts of
nature into which we can penetrate only by using the most elaborate
tools.” [42, p. 9] (emphasis added)
Of course, the fact we should acknowledge physical representation and ex-
perience has been created through concepts and tools specifically designed
is completely different from claiming that the choice of a specific experimen-
tal arrangement determines explicitly physical reality itself. As we argued
above, the KS theorem (formulated in 1967) showed that if one wishes to
retain —as Bohr did— the classical representation of physics in terms of an
ASA then the choice made by a competent experimentalist of a subset of ob-
servables —between the many possible incompatible subsets of observables—
determines in a subjective manner what is to be considered as actual (real).
This is because, due to the non-conmutative structure of the theory, not
all observables can be considered as real (actual) before the choice. This
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situation regarding the definition of physical reality was clearly recognized
by Einstein who remained always uncomfortable with the epistemological
reasoning of Bohr. As recalled by Pauli:
“Einstein’s opposition to [quantum mechanics] is again reflected in his
papers which he published, at first in collaboration with Rosen and
Podolsky , and later alone, as a critique of the concept of reality in
quantum mechanics. We often discussed these questions together, and
I invariably profited very greatly even when I could not agree with
Einstein’s view. ‘Physics is after all the description of reality’ he said
to me, continuing, with a sarcastic glance in my direction ‘or should I
perhaps say physics is the description of what one merely imagines?’
This question clearly shows Einstein’s concern that the objective char-
acter of physics might be lost through a theory of the type of quantum
mechanics, in that as a consequence of a wider conception of the ob-
jectivity of an explanation of nature the difference between physical
reality and dream or hallucination might become blurred.” [47, p.
122]
But quite independently of Einstein’s efforts to discuss the possible rep-
resentation of quantum reality, the Bohrian approach has become a silent
orthodoxy that limits the analysis of QM down to the almost exclusive set of
problems —which capture Bohr’s main desiderata— that presuppose always
the representation of reality that results from classical physics. Firstly, the
presupposition that there must exist a continuous limit between QM and
classical physics. Secondly, the idea that phenomena must be always repre-
sented and understood as classical space-time phenomena. Unfortunately,
these problems have been also entangled with incompatible philosophical
stances, producing a lot of confusion not only with respect to the metaphys-
ical presuppositions and standpoints of the problems themselves but also
with respect to their limits of inquiry.
4 Disentangling Orthodox Problems in QM
As analyzed in [23] the OLR deals with a specific set of problems which ana-
lyze QM from a classical perspective. This means that all problems assume
as a standpoint a classical representation and only reflect on the formalism
in “negative terms”, that is, in terms of the failure of QM to account for the
classical representation of reality and its concepts: separability, space, time,
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locality, individuality, identity, actuality, etc. The “negative” problems are
thus: non-separability, non-locality, non-individuality, non-identity, etc.6
These problems start their analysis from the notions of classical physics as-
suming implicitly as a standpoint the strong metaphysical presupposition
that QM should be able to represent physical reality according to such clas-
sical notions. But in between the many problems that can be found in the
literature there are two unsolved main problems which show most explicitly
the impossibilities of QM with respect to classical physics. The first problem
relates directly to the issue of contextuality and is called the “basis problem”:
Basis Problem (BP): Given the fact that Ψ can be expressed by multiple
incompatible bases —given by the choice of a CSCO— and that due to the
KS theorem the observables arising from such bases cannot be interpreted as
simultaneously preexistent, the question is: how does Nature make a choice
between the different bases? Which is the objective physical process that leads
to a particular basis instead of a different one?
Once again, the BP is a way of discussing quantum contextuality in “neg-
ative terms”. The problem already sets the solution through the specificity
of its questioning. The problem presupposes that there is a path —in accor-
dance to the quantum to classical limit imposed by Bohr— from the weird
contextual quantum formalism to a classical noncontextual experimental set
up in which classical discourse holds. If one could explain this path through
an objective physical process then the choice of the experimenter could be
regarded also as part of an objective process as well —and not one that
determines reality. Unfortunately, still today the problem remains with no
solution within the limits of the orthodox formalism. There is no physical
representation of the process without the addition of strange ad hoc rules;
rules which not only lack any physical justification but, more importantly,
also limit the MPS of the theory (section 5).
A very different problem —sometimes also mixed and partly confused
with the BP— is the so called “measurement problem” which deals explicitly
with the superposition principle and takes as a standpoint a specific basis
or context.
Measurement Problem (MP): Given a specific basis (or CSCO) QM de-
scribes mathematically a state in terms of a superposition (of states), since
6I am greatful to Bob Coecke for this linguistic insight.
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the evolution described by QM allow us to predict that the quantum system
will get entangled with the apparatus and thus its pointer positions will also
become a superposition,7 the question is why do we observe a single outcome
instead of a superposition of them?
The measurement problem is also a way of discussing the formalism in “neg-
ative terms” with respect to classical physics. In this case the problem con-
centrates in the justification of measurement outcomes —instead of trying
to physically represent quantum superpositions in terms of new non-classical
concepts (section 7). It should be remarked that the MP presupposes that
the basis (or context) —directly related to a measurement set up— has been
already determined. Thus it should be clear that there is no question re-
garding the contextual character of the theory within this specific problem.
But once the experimental arrangement is settled —leaving aside the BP—
a new problem appears: due to the superposition principle one can find,
within a context, that the state is mathematically described in term of the
so called “quantum superpositions” which are weird mathematical expres-
sions composed by sets of states, |αi〉, each one of them giving rise to a set of
(compatible) projectors, |αi〉〈αi|, interpreted as compatible observables (or
properties). As we have discussed in [19], such quantum superpositions can
be, in general, composed by contradictory properties. Notice that given a Ψ
we call a quantum superposition to each different representation of the Ψ in
a specific basis. Thus the Ψ gives rise to different superpositions, each one of
them determined within a CSCO. This goes against the orthodox assump-
tion that every superposition arising from Ψ is “the same” superposition
irrespectively of the basis, implying through this idea a reintroduction of
contextuality within the MP. This interpretation confuses the whole prob-
lem and changes the question at stake. We have extensively discussed this
interpretational maneuver and the meaning of quantum superpositions in
[25].
In the MP the weirdness appears because a superposition can be com-
posed simultaneously by a specific property (e.g., the system has the prop-
7Given a quantum system represented by a superposition
∑
ci|αi〉, when in contact
with an apparatus ready to measure, |R0〉, QM predicts that system and apparatus will
become “entangled” in such a way that the final ‘system + apparatus’ will be described
by
∑
ci|αi〉|Ri〉. Thus, as a consequence of the quantum evolution, the pointers have also
become —like the original quantum system— a superposition of pointers
∑
ci|Ri〉. This
is why the MP can be stated as a problem only in the case the original quantum state is
described by a superposition of more than one term.
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erty ‘spin up in the x direction’) and its contradictory property (e.g., the
system has the property ‘spin down in the x direction’).8 On the one hand,
due to the seeming violation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC),
it makes no sense to interpret both properties as actual ones (see for discus-
sion [19]). This was cleverly exposed by Schro¨dinger in his 1935 gedanken-
experiment in which a cat, after interacting with an atom represented by a
quantum superposition, possessed at the same time the property of being
‘alive’ and the property of being ‘dead’ [48]. On the other hand, all terms in
the superposition must be considered in the evolution of the state and the
predictions that can be made from it. One could analyze what such weird
quantum superpositions represent in physical terms, instead the orthodox
literature —following Bohr— has limited the analysis through the MP to
the justification of actual measurement outcomes.
Now that we have clearly separated these two different problems some
remarks go in order. Firstly, it should be clear that the mix of subjective
and objective only appears within the BP. Due to the formalism, orthodoxy
has argued extensively that in order to recover a “classical set up” and
learn which properties are definite valued and which are not, one needs to
choose a specific context.9 But if the “choice” is not physically justified in
terms of an objective process, the definition of reality given by the subset of
properties that are actual is obviously subjective —it depends explicitly on
the choice of the experimenter. In other words, the context is not determined
prior to the choice of the experimenter and thus cannot be considered as a
preexisitent ASA. Secondly, the MP has no relation to the mix of subjective
and objective. The problem here is the justification of the path from a
superposition (of, in the most general case, contradictory properties) to a
single measurement outcome. Notice also that in the case the basis is such
that we can write the superposition as one single term, |φ〉, the MP cannot
be stated.
Since there is no classical causal explanation which explains the path
from the superposition to the actual outcome there seems to be an inde-
terministic aspect within Nature itself. The question here deals with de-
terminism and the process of measurement within a definite experimental
arrangement. But it should be clear that once the experimental arrangement
is set, the experimenter has no relation whatsoever to the actual measure-
8There is an ongoing debate regarding the interpretation of such properties in terms
of ‘contradiction’ and ‘contrariety’: [4, 5, 6, 23].
9As we have argued extensively in [26] this is not the case for QM, the choice of a
context does not transform quantum properties into classical ones.
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ment outcome that will be found in the recording apparatus. Any subjective
intromission is completely out of the question at this stage. Once the context
is chosen the measurement could be performed and the outcome recorded
by a robot.
To summarize, quantum contextuality and the BP deal with the incom-
patibility of sets of contexts or bases which are in turn interpreted in direct
relation to experimental set ups and definite properties. There is no mea-
surement process involved here but the question of how an experimental set
up and the properties it can expose is physically represented —in accordance
to the formalism of QM. The MP deals with the process of measurement
within a specific experimental set up, but in this stage the experimenter has
no intromission whatsoever. Let us make these two points clear:
I. The BP introduces the question of the physical justification of the
choice of a particular basis. The choice of the context determines
which observables can be considered as actual and which cannot. This
implicitly determines what is to be considered as real —the definite
observables within the chosen context.
II. The MP attempts to justify the path from “weird quantum superposi-
tions (of more than one term)” to a single outcome within a particular
context. Once the experimental arrangement is set the experimenter
has no influence whatsoever on the sudden appearance of the measure-
ment outcome. There is no relation to a subjective choice within the
MP, the question only regards the physical representation of the path
from a specific superposition (of more than one term) to an actual
outcome.
As we have remarked, the entanglement of these two different problems
goes back to the way in which Bohr and Hesienberg argued in favor of
the idea that the weirdness of QM could be dissolved by analyzing the
measurement process. The seed of this idea is already present within the
answer of Bohr to the EPR paper in 1935 which focuses its argumentation
in the need of choosing a definite experimental set up in order to talk about
definite observables [12]. Even though history has told us that somehow
Bohr won the EPR battle, there was no clear physical explantation to the
subtle question raised by Einstein regarding the meaning of physical reality
according to QM. Heisenberg also helped Bohr to sweep the dirt under the
carpet and tried to wipe the subjective dust away through a supposedly
clear analysis of the measurement process (see for example [42, p. 89]). But
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independently of such attempts, from a representational realist perspective
—as Einstein remarked to Pauli many years ago—, a physical theory should
be able to account coherently for what it talks about in terms of physical
reality.
5 Meaningful Statements and Counterfactual Rea-
soning in Physics
In order to discuss and analyze physical interpretations of a theory one
should first agree with respect to what should be considered as Meaningful
Physical Statements (MPS) within that theory. Furthermore, from a repre-
sentational realist perspective, the theory should be capable of representing
physically the MPS it talks about.10
Definition 5.1 Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS): If given a
specific situation a theory is capable of predicting in terms of definite phys-
ical statements the outcomes of possible measurements, then such physical
statements are meaningful relative to the theory and must be constitutive
parts of the particular representation of physical reality that the theory pro-
vides. Measurement outcomes must be considered only as an exposure of the
empirical adequacy (or not) of the theory.
It must be remarked that a MPS pertains to the physical representation
provided by the particular theory, this means we leave open —going against
Bohr’s second desiderata— the possibility that experience is not reduced to
actual measurement outcomes. It should be also noticed that this defini-
tion of MPS should be only followed by those who attempt to provide an
objective description of physical reality. Because MPS pertain to physical
representation, from a representational realist account of physics MPS are
necessarily related to counterfactual reasoning.
Definition 5.2 Counterfactual Reasoning (CR): The possibility to make
MPS in terms of a physical representation allows in general for counterfac-
tual statements in physical discourse. If the theory is empirically adequate
then such MPS are presupposed to be that of which the theory talks about.
10This is of course not the case for the sort of empiricists who takes actual observation
as its fundament. The empiricist position is however in deep disagreement with the fact
that physical experience is always theory laden (see for discussion [22]).
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MPS are not necessarily statements about future events, they can be also
statements about past and present events. CR about MPS comprise all ac-
tual and non-actual physical experience.
If we accept the RRPT stance (section 1), physical representation must
take into account the MPS produced by the theory. This also implies that
CR is a necessary condition that a theory must uphold for without it there is
no possibility of physical representation nor physical discourse. Without CR
in physical discourse one cannot imagine experience beyond actuality. For a
representational realist, the power of physics is CR itself, it is the capability
that allows us to predict that “if I perform this or that experiment” then
—if it is a MPS— the physical theory will tell me that “the outcome will be
x or y”, and I do not need to actually perform the experiment! I know what
the result will be independently of actually performing the experiment or
not.11 That is the whole point of being a realist about physics, that I trust
the theory to be talking about a physical representation of reality. CR in
physical discourse has nothing to do with time, evolution nor dynamics, it
has to do with the possibility of representing experience. A physical theory
allows me to make claims about the future, the present and the past, just in
the same way physical invariance in classical mechanics connects the multi-
ple frames of reference without me being in any particular one. CR is the
discursive invariance with respect to physical phenomena. We do not need
to be in a specific frame to know what will happen in that specific frame or
a different one. Notice, once again, that CR is a necessary condition only
for representational realist approaches, not for those philosophical positions
which denying the theory-ladenness of physical experience are grounded on
raw experimental data.
Remark: CR is a necessary condition for a coherent discourse about MPS
that pertain to a particular physical representation —consequently, also for
supporting RRPT.
After providing these definitions we are now ready to discuss which state-
ments can be considered as MPS within quantum theory. The quantum wave
function Ψ gives rise to clear definite physical statements regarding observ-
11The fact that what we know is given in statistical terms does not imply that we
need to explain such predictions in classical terms. Or that knowledge boils down only
to ‘knowledge that accounts for certainty about actuality’. In the case of QM we have
‘certain knowledge in statistical terms’.
20
ables through the Born rule. Are the statements that one can make using
the Born rule meaningful? Of course they are! This is what the theory is
all about. All statements of the type, “the average value of observable A is
a (given by the Born Rule)”, are MPS for QM. Each one of the measure-
ment outcomes of QM has been tested to be in accordance with such type
of MPS.12
Definition 5.3 MPS in QM: Given a vector in Hilbert space, Ψ, the Born
rule allows us to predict the average value of (any) observable O.
〈Ψ|O|Ψ〉 = 〈O〉
This prediction is independent of the choice of any particular basis.
This definition of MPS in QM implies that according to the formalism all
observables —independently of the context— must be considered as part of
physical (quantum) reality simultaneously and independently of the choice
of the context. This is of course —due to contextuality— not possible if we
consider physical reality only in terms of an ASA. This shows that, either the
formalism should be changed in order to recover a classical representation of
reality or, that we should shift to a non-classical representation of physical
reality.
6 Revisiting Griffiths’ Arguments Against Quan-
tum Contextuality
Griffiths argues already in the abstract of his paper that:
“[...] quantum mechanics is noncontextual if quantum properties are
represented by subspaces of the quantum Hilbert space (as proposed by
von Neumann) rather than by hidden variables. In particular, a mea-
surement using an appropriately constructed apparatus can be shown
to reveal the value of an observable A possessed by the measured sys-
tem before the measurement took place, whatever other compatible
([B,A] = 0) observable B may be measured at the same time.” [38, p.
174]
12Notice that the idea that only actual properties are real has led quantum logic and
also modal interpretations to restrict the MPS in QM only to a specific subset of them;
i.e. those which imply a certain knowledge of an outcome. Those observables which have
probability equal to 1.
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According to Griffiths [Op. cit., p. 174]: “a substantial literature has ac-
cumulated which would throw doubt on this or suggest the opposite on the
basis of various arguments related to the Kochen-Specker theorem.” Grif-
fiths builds up his argumentation against contextuality from the analysis
and discussion of four main points or ideas:
i. The idea that physical reality according to QM is not classical reality.
ii. The idea that in order to understand QM one needs to use the SFR
and abandon CR.
iii. The idea that one can “get rid” of Schro¨dinger’s cat through the SFR.
iv. The idea that contextuality can be discussed through the analysis of
quantum measurements.
In this section we attempt to show that the arguments which support
these ideas contain several flaws mainly due to multiple shifts in the meta-
physical stance of analysis. Even though Griffiths claims to provide a realist
account of QM, his own justification and analysis is in many respects close
from instrumentalism. But as we have discussed above, a realist interpre-
tation of QM cannot be justified using a set of instrumentalist arguments.
The criticisms provided in this section against the CH interpretation can be
easily extended to several (supposedly) realist interpretations of QM.
6.1 “Quantum Reality” Is Not “Classical Reality”
Griffiths argues that the wrong assumption, that QM talks about classical
reality, has led to the idea that QM is contextual:
“How have so many come to [the] conclusion [that QM is contextual]?
By adopting, we shall argue, the view that the real world is classical,
contrary to all we have learned from the development of quantum me-
chanics in the twentieth century. In particular, discussions couched
in terms of hidden variables typically assume that they are classical
rather than the sort of thing one might expect in a quantum mechan-
ical world.” [Op. cit., p. 174]
As we have discussed above (section 2), KS theorem makes exactly the same
point against classical representations of QM: because of contextuality QM
cannot be described in terms of a classical ASA kind of representation. KS
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should be understood as an ad absurdum proof of the failure of the notion of
(classical) actual preexistence to account for what QM is talking about [26].
The conclusion that must be drawn is the following: in case we want to stay
close to orthodox Hilbert space QM, then projection operators cannot be
interpreted in terms of actually preexistent properties13 —which is what, as
we shall see, Griffiths ends up trying to do.
According to Griffiths:
“The way our approach avoids any conflict with the Kochen-Specker
theorem is by denying Re [Realism about properties]. The claim that
every observable possesses a value at every time is, indeed, inconsistent
with a representation of quantum properties by subspaces of a Hilbert
space. Consider, for example, a spin-half particle. There are distinct
rays in the two-dimensional Hilbert space corresponding to Sx = +
1
2
(in units of h) and to Sx = − 12 ; also rays corresponding to Sz = + 12
and Sz = − 12 , but there is no ray that can represent a simultaneous
value of Sx and Sz. Students are told, correctly, that Sx and Sz cannot
be measured simultaneously, and they ought to be told that the reason
for this is that there is nothing there to be measured. The projectors
corresponding to Sz do not commute with the projectors corresponding
to Sx, and once one has accepted the connection between quantum
properties and Hilbert subspaces proposed by von Neumann it makes
no sense to speak of a spin half system in which, for example, Sx = +
1
2
at the same time that Sz = +
1
2 .” [Op. cit., p. 179] (emphasis added)
As we have discussed above, the condition Re is perfectly well founded in
the physical representation provided by classical Newtonian mechanics in
terms of an ASA. Now, the fact that two observables do not commute does
not only imply that the observables cannot be measured together but more
importantly, that one cannot assign a GV to them, and this in turn precludes
the possibility of representing what is going on in terms of an ASA (see also
for discussion [28]). But of course there are things to be measured! As a
matter of fact every observable when related to a Ψ determines a MPS in
QM in terms of the Born rule (section 5). If I analyze spin in the x-direction
then I will find out that the average value of ‘spin up’ is a and the average
value of ‘spin down’ is b, and the same happens with the spin in the z-
direction or in any other direction I would like to measure. QM provides
13Even worse, as we have proven in [28], the fact there is no value invariance of dynamical
observables makes untenable the very idea of discussing about a physical system.
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the correct predictions to all such MPS. For these reasons, the author of
this paper does not understand at all what is Griffiths trying to say when
he claims that “there is nothing to be measured”.
Griffiths continues arguing that:
“It is somewhat odd that this particular principle [Re] should be iden-
tified with realism, since at the present time all available experimental
evidence is in accord with Hilbert space quantum mechanics, and not
with classical physics when the two disagree. If a Hilbert space provides
the appropriate mathematics to describe everything from the quarks
to the quasars, where in the real world, the one we live in, is there any
part that satisfies the condition of “realism” given by Re? It would be
much less confusing if whenever “realism” were used in this way the
adjective “classical” were prepended. The hidden variables of typical
hidden variable theories are classical hidden variables, and it is for this
reason that the attempt to use them for interpreting quantum theory
has given rise to numerous conflicts with the latter.” [Op. cit., p. 179]
We completely agree with Griffiths that the realism discussed is in fact “clas-
sical realism”, however we disagree that one can, from a realist stance, argue
that it is enough to predict the correct measurement outcomes. What we
need, if one attempts to be a realist, is to either develop a new formal-
ism that describes things in terms of an ASA (i.e., in terms of “classical
reality”) —as the HVP attempts to do— or to find a new non-classical rep-
resentation of physical reality which takes into account all MPS in QM. It
is simply incorrect to argue in favor of realist interpretation of QM using an
instrumentalist argument, that is, that the formalism provides the correct
“experimental evidence”. What matters for a realist is the physical repre-
sentation of reality provided by the theory, and still today we do not know
what QM is talking about —what we know is that due to contextuality the
orthodox formalism is not taking about an ASA.
6.2 Applying the SFR (Instead of CR) in QM
In several papers, Griffiths —who is certainly not alone in supporting this
idea— has argued against CR in physical discourse [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41].
According to him [38, p. 178]: “Analyzing counterfactual questions is a bit
tricky even in situations not entangled with quantum mysteries.” Indeed,
this idea of CR being something “tricky” or “weird” is quite widespread
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within the literature. In order to escape the consequences of CR Griffiths
proposes to “block” this discursive condition in QM through the introduction
of what he calls the Single Framework Rule (SFR).14
“The single framework rule asserts that any sort of discussion of the
quantum system must be carried out in some framework of the sort
just discussed, which is typically chosen because it has some events
which are interesting for some reason or another. The physicist is free
to choose any framework he pleases for describing the world; what the
single framework rule prohibits is combining frameworks. [...] The
well-known Kochen-Specker paradox is constructed precisely by form-
ing a bridge, or one might better say bridges, between incompatible
frameworks in such a way that one eventually ends up with a contra-
diction. The histories approach disposes of the paradox by declaring
the bridging invalid.” [Op. cit., p. 180]
As we have argued above, one thing is a representation of reality ac-
cording to a theory and a very different one is a specific observation of one
particular aspect of such physical representation. Indeed, for a represen-
tation to be coherent one needs a consistent relation between such multi-
ple observations and perspectives. Invariance of Galilei transformations in
classical mechanics or Lorentz transformation in relativity theory are good
examples of such consistency between different frames of reference. CR is
the discursive invariance which allows one to claim that, if the physical rep-
resentation is adequate, then the phenomenon A will have the result a while
the phenomenon B will have the result b, and so forth. CR presupposes
—according to the realist stance— that there is a physical representation
of reality according to the theory. The fact that we can talk about such
physical representation without the need to actually perform experiments is
the very condition of coherent discourse in physics.
Continuing his argumentation Griffiths makes the point that:
“It is important to note that the single-framework rule does not state
that there is only one framework which can be used for a valid quantum
14An equivalent formulation or use of SFR is provided, just to mention a few interpre-
tations in Dieks original modal interpretation which restricts the context to the one in
which the Born rule gives probability 1 (certainty) to an observable [29, 30], by Dieks and
Vermaas in their generalization of the modal interpretation to density operators [52], by
Bene and Dieks within their perspectival version of the modal interpretation [10] and by
Svozil in [49].
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description of a situation. The quantum physicist is free to choose any
framework, consistent with the Hilbert space structure of quantum me-
chanics (and, in the case of histories, satisfying consistency conditions
if the extension of the Born rule is to be used to assign probabilities),
in order to describe a quantum system. In some frameworks a partic-
ular observable A may possess some value, while in other frameworks
it may not. The existence of the latter does not preclude the possi-
bility or the validity of a framework which include the former. The
single framework rule is not a restriction on the use of frameworks; it
is instead a prohibition against combining incompatible frameworks.”
[Op. cit., p. 180]
With respect to this argumentation by Griffiths some remarks go in or-
der. Firstly, physical representation involves the need to be able to discuss
of all contexts simultaneously; properties of different contexts cannot be
brought into reality by virtue of a choice if we want to claim at the same
time that our representation of reality is not defined subjectively. There
should be no subjective choice in order to claim that a given property is
actually existent or not (i.e., has a value or not). Secondly, the ontologi-
cal incompatibility of quantum properties should not be confused with the
epistemological incompatibility of distinct measurements.15 As a matter of
fact, even in classical physics we can certainly have a situation in which
there is an epistemological incompatibility between different measurements
of the same system. Due to the specific questioning I might not be able to
perform two measurements simultaneously. In general, not all properties of
a classical physical object can be measured at the same time. However, and
this is what really matters, in classical physics all properties in a given sit-
uation are consistent with possessing a definite value, making it possible to
understand any classical situation in terms of an ASA —all classical prop-
erties of a system are ontologically compatible. In other words, it is not the
epistemological incompatibility of measurements which is at stake through
quantum contextuality but the ontological incompatibility of the values of
properties which allow for a GV —and thus a description in terms of an
ASA.
But the strangest aspect of the argumentation of this second idea by
Griffiths (section 6.2) is its contradiction with his first own argument by
which QM is not to be represented through “classical reality” (section 6.1).
15See in this respect the analysis provided by Aerts regarding classical and quantum
experiments and properties in operational quantum logic [2, 3].
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Griffiths now argues —in this second point— that the SFR should be used
in order to talk about “properties with preexistent values”. But this is
exactly the “classical” physical representation that Griffiths had criticized
in the first place (section 6.1). The two arguments (from sections 6.1 and
6.2) are flagrantly in contradiction, both cannot stand together within the
same approach.
Contrary to what is claimed by Griffiths, according to the author of
this paper, the SFR is an ad hoc rule which explicitly shows that Hilbert
space QM is contextual. It is an external addition that blocks an essential
aspect of the formalism, an aspect which is key to the predictions of QM
and the MPS it provides. In this sense the HVP is not so different from the
CH interpretation which ends up doing exactly the same, namely, changing
or restricting the formalism in order to recover a description in terms of
“classical reality”.
6.3 “Getting Rid” of Quantum Superpositions
Griffiths16 [Op. cit., p. 177] considers the question: “What will occur if
the experimenter prepares an initial state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a1〉 + |a2〉) which is
a superposition corresponding to two distinct eigenvalues of a1 and a2 of
A and then carries out a measurement?” But as discussed in detail in
[20, 25], there is a subtlety involved because the state |ψ〉 is not identical
to the state 1√
2
(|a1〉 + |a2〉). Of course it is the same vector, but one can
also argue that |ψ〉 makes special reference to an experimental arrangement
such that only the observable |ψ〉〈ψ| is measured —obtaining with certainty
its eigenvalue— and 1√
2
(|a1〉 + |a2〉) makes reference to an experimental
arrangement in which A is measured —obtaining each result with probability
0.5; the result related to |a1〉 and the result related to |a2〉. If we call V , P1
and P2 the projection operators related to |ψ〉, |a1〉 and |a2〉, respectively,
then, according to Griffiths, because the projections V , P1 and P2 do not
commute one can apply the SFR [Op. cit., p. 177].
Some remarks go in order. Firstly, a superposition is a particular math-
ematical representation of a vector in Hilbert space Ψ. Secondly, the SFR
cannot help in dissolving or doing away with quantum superpositions be-
cause quantum superpositions are defined —as we discussed above— within
a single context, they are not constituted by incompatible observables. Let
16The denial of the existence of quantum superpositions by Griffiths has been analyzed
in detail in [25]. Here we only attempt to discuss Griffiths argumentation against quantum
superpositions using the SFR.
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us remark this important point: there is no quantum superposition com-
posed by states which give rise to incompatible observable. Of course, given
a typical Stern-Gerlach (SG) type experiment, one can have a particular
quantum superposition such as c1x| ↑x〉 + c2x| ↓x〉, and one can also find
different superpositions through a change of basis. For example, if we pro-
duce a rotation of the SG to the y-direction we will obtain the superposition
c1y| ↑y〉 + c2y| ↓y〉. As we have argued extensively, these are to be consid-
ered —contrary to what is claimed by the orthodox interpretation— as two
different superpositions which give rise to different sets of MPS [25]. While
the former superposition provides information of what will happen if the SG
is placed in the x-direction (MPS about the observable Sx), the latter su-
perposition provides information in case the SG is placed in the y-direction
(MPS about the observable Sy). Thirdly, the problem with quantum super-
positions, as we have extensible argued in [19], is that the same observable
(e.g., Sx) can give rise to contradictory properties within the same superpo-
sition. But due to the PNC —which defines both ontologically and logically
the realm of actuality (see for discussion [27])— both properties cannot be
simultaneously considered as actually preexistent. Even when interpreted in
terms of possibilities (rather than actualities), as it is the case of quantum
logic and several versions of the modal interpretation, such possibilities must
be necessarily considered as quantum possibilities (see for discussion [26]).
The criticism provided by Griffiths to the Many Worlds (MW) interpre-
tation of QM also makes clear the fact there is a mix between the MP and
the BP in his argumentation against Schro¨dinger’s cat.
“[...] the histories approach is distinctly different from the Everett or
many-worlds interpretation with its insistence that “the wave func-
tion”, in this instance the state onto which V projects, represents fun-
damental physical reality. From the histories point of view the diffi-
culties which many-worlds advocates have in explaining how ordinary
macroscopic physics can be consistent with their perspective is not un-
related to the fact that they are seeking to assign simultaneous reality
to properties which in the quantum Hilbert space are represented by
incompatible projectors.” [Op. cit., p. 177]
Contrary to this claim, MW focuses in solving the MP, and deals in no way
with incompatible projectors [26, 32]. MW attempts to provide physical
meaning to quantum superpositions by multiplying classical reality as many
times as terms are found in a superposition. The fundamental solution
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provided by MW to the MP does not deal in any way with contextuality
nor the BP.
The discussion provided by Griffiths continues calling the attention to
the need of considering the measurement process. Griffiths then argues [Op.
cit., p. 177] that: “[...] getting rid of the ghost of Schro¨dinger’s cat, we
still need to show that the measurement apparatus actually carries out a
measurement; i.e., the outcome pointer position is properly correlated with
a previous property of the measured system. For this purpose we need an
extension of Born’s rule that allows probabilities to be assigned to a closed
quantum system at three or more times, and this in turn requires the use of
consistent (or decoherent) families of histories.” Once again, the problem is
shifted to the justification of the measurement process.
6.4 Measurement Process and Contextuality
According to Griffiths: “The most direct approach to determining whether
quantum theory is or is not contextual is to analyze the process that goes
on in a quantum measurement.” [Op. cit., p. 176] We have argued exten-
sively why this cannot be the case. Quantum measurements have nothing
to say about the contextual character of QM simply because contextuality
says nothing about measurements. Contextuality deals with the orthodox
formalism and the limits of any consistent interpretation that stays close
to it, while measurement outcomes should only be considered as particu-
lar expressions of what the theory tells us physical reality is about. As we
have discussed above, from a realist perspective, measurements cannot be
considered as more fundamental than the physical representation provided
by the theory. For a representational realist about physics measurement
outcomes are to be interpreted in terms of the physical representation and
not the other way around. This is the reason why Einstein —a realist which
clearly understood the importance of representation within the definition of
phenomena [43]— said to Heisenberg a long time ago: “It is only the theory
which can tell you what can be observed.”
The discussion about the measurement process in QM has been a way to
hide all we do not understand about the theory. Bohr, and also Heisenberg,
insisted on the idea that through an analysis of the measurement process the
problems of the quantum disappeared. However, they were never truly able
to resolve the MP nor the BP —which are in themselves attempts to justify
the classical physical description of reality. In the present the situation
hasn’t changed a single bit. As discussed above, it has become clear that
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best candidate of orthodoxy to try to solve the quantum to classical limit,
namely, decoherence, has also failed to provide a physical explanation and
representation of the measurement process.
One of the main statements of Griffiths [Op. cit., p. 174] goes against
“the view that the real world is classical, contrary to all we have learned from
the development of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century.” Griffiths
remarks that: “at the present time all available experimental evidence is in
accord with Hilbert space quantum mechanics, and not with classical physics
when the two disagree.” However, empirical adequacy cannot be taken as
an argument about the reality of the measurement process. The fact that
we can do things in the lab does not mean that we can represent them or un-
derstand what is going on. This is according to our representational realist
perspective, the main difference between physics and technology in con-
tradistinction to instrumentalism which denies the very need of explaining
physical phenomena. To say it differently: there can be no realist solution
“For All Practical Proposes” (FAPP) as the decoherent orthodoxy claims
and also Griffiths implicitly seems to imply. FAPP is just a gentle way of
saying: “We do not know how it works, but it doesn’t matter, it (somehow)
works!” A realist cannot remain satisfied with this answer.
7 What is the Problem (for a Representational
Realist) in QM?
The fundament of a representational realist approach is that a mathemat-
ical formalism when coherently related to a network of physical concepts
is capable of producing a physical representation of reality. The particular
empirical exposures are just that, findings in experience of what is already
expressed by the theory through its physical representation. This is the
whole point of being a representational realist about physics. From this
standpoint there are no epistemological concerns whatsoever. Epistemolog-
ical questions are part of a different set of problems where we humans enter
the picture in a fundamental manner. Thus, the aim of an ontological re-
alistic approach to QM should be, in the very first place, to account for a
representation of physical reality that coherently relates to the formalism.
It is not enough to say that QM does not relate to “classical reality”. This
is not doing the job. The formalism of QM has proven already to be em-
pirically adequate. As we have argued elsewhere [23], instead of changing
the formalism or adding ad hoc rules in order to go back a few squares
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and recover a classical representation of physical reality, there is a different
strategy that could be considered. According to this new strategy —which
we have called the Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research (CMLR)—
what needs to be done is to construct a new net of (non-classical) concepts
capable of interpreting the formalism as it is.
Starting from the formalism, then adding ad hoc rules —such as the
SFR— in order to make the formalism “more classical” (noncontextual) and
then trying to get to a measurement outcome —despite the fact there is up
to the present no satisfactory solutions given to the MP nor the BP— does
not solve the problem at all. This seems to be instead some sort of hidden
instrumentalist approach which remains silent about what really matters:
the physical representation of reality according to QM.
An example of this instrumentalist move is witnessed by the fact that
many approaches are obsessed —as Griffiths put it— with “getting rid of
the ghost of Schro¨dinger’s cat”. This negative stance towards quantum su-
perpositions shows that such approaches are not willing to take seriously the
problem of finding a physical representation that matches the mathematical
formalism. According to the author of this paper, contextuality should be
neither regarded as a “ghost” which we need to fight or destroy, it should
be taken as one of the key elements that must help us in understanding QM
and the type of physical reality it implies. Technological and experimental
developments are going much faster than the present discussion regarding
foundational issues about QM, discussions which are still stuck by the limits
imposed by Bohr to the OLR. This is one of the main reasons we believe that
the field is in need of a strong criticism. The BP and MP which attempt to
build a bridge between QM and our classical understanding of reality, could
be replaced in the literature by new problems which assume the possibility
of a new representation of physical reality according to QM. In [21, 23], we
put forward two new problems which could help to think, from a different
perspective, the problem of interpretation in QM. The first, which is the one
that interests us here and should replace the BP, was called the Contextu-
ality Problem (CP):
Contextuality Problem (CP): Given the fact that Hilbert space QM is a
contextual theory, the question is which are the concepts that would allow us
to coherently interpret the formalism and provide a representation of physi-
cal reality that accounts for this feature of the theory?
The CP —as well as the superposition problem discussed in [25]— opens
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the possibility to truly discuss a physical representation of reality which
goes beyond the classical representation of physics in terms of an ASA. We
are convinced that without a replacement of the problems addressed in the
literature there is no true possibility of discussing an interpretation of QM
which provides an objective non-classical physical representation of reality.
We know of no reasons to believe that this is not doable.
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